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This paper provides a new approach to inference to the best explanation
(IBE) based on a new coherence measure for comparing how well hypothe-
ses explain the evidence. It addresses a number of criticisms of the use of
probabilistic measures in this context by Clark Glymour ([2015]), including
limitations of earlier work on IBE (Glass [2012]). Computer experiments
are used to show that the new approach finds the truth with a high degree
of accuracy in hypothesis selection tasks and that in some cases its accuracy
is greater than hypothesis selection based on maximizing posterior proba-
bility. Hence, by overcoming some of the problems with the previous ap-
proach, this work provides a more adequate defence of IBE and suggets
that IBE not only tracks truth but also has practical advantages over thep e-
vious approach. Applications of the new approach to parameter estimation
and model selection are also explored.
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Inference to the best explanation (IBE) has often been proposed and defended as
a mode of reasoning in both science and everyday life (see Lipton [2004]). IBE is
also of particular relevance to debates about scientific realism since proponents of
realism often appeal to it (see Psillos [1999]). The basic idea in IBE is that com-
peting hypotheses are compared in terms of how well they explain the evidence in
a given context and an inference made to the winning hypothesis. While IBE has
intuitive appeal, it has come in for serious criticism (see particularly van Fraassen
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[1989]), though significant defences have also been presentd (see particularly
Douven [1999], [2013]).
A significant challenge for advocates of IBE is to show how explanation is re-
lated to truth. Clearly, such a link is fundamental to IBE, but it is not immediately
obvious why hypotheses that provide better explanations would be more likely to
be true. One approach to this problem is to consider probabilistic measures of
explanatory goodness and investigate, either analytically or via computer simula-
tions, how successful they are at selecting the true hypothesis. Various measures
of this kind have been proposed in the literature (see Schupbach [2011a] and ref-
erences therein), but here the focus is on using two measuresof coherence to rank
explanations.
There has been considerable discussion of probabilistic appro ches to coher-
ence in the literature (see for example Bovens and Hartmann [2003]; Olsson
[2005]). In previous work, it was argued that a particular coherence measure,
the overlap measure, has some merit as a measure for ranking explanations (Glass
[2007]) and, based on simulations, that it tracks truth whenused for hypothesis
selection (Glass [2012]). It was further shown that when there is uncertainty in
the prior probabilities of the hypotheses, this measure canoutperform other ap-
proaches to hypothesis selection including the approach that maximizes the pos-
terior probability.
This work, along with other probabilistic measures of explanatory power, has
received some significant criticisms recently (Glymour [2015]). In addition to
raising general concerns about the ability of these approaches to handle cases
involving ‘excellent but false explanations’ and ‘causal explanations’, Prof. Gly-
mour presents a number of specific criticisms of the coherenc-based approach to
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hypothesis selection. Perhaps the most significant criticism in this category is that
in cases where there is uncertainty in the priors the advantage of this approach
decreases rapidly as the sample size increases. The focus ofthe riginal paper
(Glass [2012]) was on IBE in the context where a hypothesis is selected on the
basis of a piece of evidence. In modelling this probabilistically, the simulations
involved making an inference on a single trial and hence a sample size of one. As
the current work will show, not only is Glymour’s criticism correct, but even when
priors are known the approach does not track truth as closelywhen the sample size
is larger. As such, more work is needed if IBE is to be defended.
In this paper, another coherence measure is proposed to provide an alternative
way to rank explanations and it is shown to overcome the problem noted above and
to address several other concerns identified by Glymour. Section 2 provides a brief
overview of the various measures and considers Glymour’s criticisms. The new
measure is then presented in section 3 and its performance when applied to hy-
pothesis selection is considered when the priors are known in section 4 and when
there is uncertainty in the priors in section 5. Applications of the new approach
to parameter estimation and model selection are explored insection 6 before con-
clusions are drawn in section 7.
2 A Response to Prof. Glymour
For a hypothesish that provides an explanation ofe, the measures considered
by Glymour include Schupbach and Sprenger’s ([2011]) measur of explanatory
power:
ESS(e, h) =
P (h|e)− P (h|∼e)
P (h|e) + P (h|∼e)
, (1)
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an alternative measure of explanatory power proposed by Crupi and Tentori ([2012]):












P (e|h)− P (e)
1− P (e)
if P (e|h) ≥ P (e)
P (e|h)− P (e)
P (e)
if P (e|h) < P (e).
(2)
and the overlap coherence measure (OCM) used to rank explanations by Glass
([2007], [2012]):
EOCM(e, h) =
P (h ∧ e)
P (h ∨ e)
. (3)
The focus here is on responding to criticisms insofar as theyapply toEOCM , but
the other measures are included for comparative purposes since all three can be
used to compare hypotheses in terms of how well they explain the evidence. Other
measures considered by Glymour include Myrvold’s ([2003])measure of unifica-
tion, Wheeler’s ([2009]) measure of coherence or ‘focused correlation’ and Fitel-
son’s ([2003]) measure of coherence, but these measures werproposed to address
different problems and are not so relevant to the current paper.1
Before responding to criticisms, it is worth noting some differences between
EOCM on the one hand andESS andECT on the other.ESS andECT are both mea-
sures of confirmation or relevance since it follows from their definitions that ifh
explainse, then the degree of explanatory power is greater than (equalto / less
than) 0 if and only ifP (e|h) is greater than (equal to / less than)P (e). Schup-
bach and Sprenger seek to explicate explanatory power in terms of the ability of a
hypothesis ‘to decrease the degree to which we find the explanandum surprising’
([2011], p. 108) and Crupi and Tentori adopt this approach also. EOCM by con-
trast is not a confirmation measure and so a high value does notnecessarily imply
1Though Fitelson’s measure has been used to rank explanations and compared withEOCM
previously (Glass [2012]).
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positive relevance. This is because a high prior probability for a hypothesis could
compensate to some extent for negative relevance.
A further difference is that in proposingEOCM the focus was on using it in the
context of IBE to compare different hypotheses in terms of howwell they explain
a common explanandum,e, so thath1 is to be preferred overh2 as an explanation
for e if EOCM(e, h1) > EOCM(e, h2) (see Glass [2012]).ESS andECT are intended
not merely for comparative purposes, but to provide a satisfactory absolute value
of explanatory power. Of course, they can then be used to compare hypotheses,
but in fact for a given explanandum bothESS andECT will give the same ordering
of hypotheses and this turns out to be the same ordering as given by the likelihood,
i.e. h1 is to preferred overh2 as an explanation fore if P (e|h1) > P (e|h2).
Much more could be said by way of comparison of the different approaches.
For example, arguablyESS andECT can be construed as alternative measures of
the extent to which a hypothesis leads us to expect the explanandum given the
truth of that hypothesis, whereasEOCM also attempts to take into account how
plausible the hypothesis is in the first place. This might mean th tESS andECT
should not be seen as rivals toEOCM , but rather as explicating a different con-
cept. However, a detailed comparison is beyond the scope of this paper and so the
above discussion is just intended to provide some relevant context before consid-
ering Glymour’s criticisms.
2.1 Excellent but false explanations
The first problem arises from the fact that scientific theories can provide excellent
explanations even though they are now known to be false. As Glymour points
out, ‘Newtonian explanations of various planetary orbits,or of Kepler’s laws, still
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count as explanations although the falsity of Newtonian theory is settled’ ([2015],
p. 594). The difficulty is that if the probability assigned toa theory is zero, the
measures ‘that are functions of the unconditional or conditional probability of a
hypothesis are either undefined or give perverse results’. Note thatEOCM will
have the value zero in such cases.2
Glymour discusses a suggestion from a reviewer to treat historical hypothe-
ses as true and make the probabilities to be the subjective probabilities of those
who justly accepted the theories. He rightly raises concerns about this proposal,
mentioning problems about how to compare the explanatory power f historical
theories that cannot both have probability one as well as difficulties concerning
probability and acceptance. Apart from this particular proposal, though, Gly-
mour also raises more general problems about which probabilities are to be used.
Should we use our marginal probabilities for the hypothesesand the evidence or
those of historical figures or perhaps some combination of the two? And this is
further complicated by the fact that the same question can berais d for the vari-
ous likelihoods. If we use our probability for the evidence when dealing with past
cases then the probability of the evidence will be one, whichpresents problems
for confirmation measures likeESS andECT .
Of course, many of these and related questions can be raised in the context of
Bayesianism, but those debates will not be revisited here. Tokeep the discussion
more focused, let us consider whether there are problems here t at go beyond
those faced by the Bayesian. And it seems there are. In dealingwith historical
2If regularity is assumed, then the theory will not be assigned a probability of zero, but if it
is assigned a very low value, thenEOCM will also be very low provided the probability of the
evidence is not too low.
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cases, Bayesians will attempt to capture key aspects of scientific reasoning by us-
ing probabilities (both marginal and conditional) that would have been reasonable
in that context. Now, of course, questions can be raised about that, but propo-
nents of the measures of explanatory power might appear to bemaking ahistorical
claims about scientific theories and in that case Glymour’s concerns seem partic-
ularly pertinent.
In response, it can be noted that this appearance is misleading, at least in
the context in whichEOCM was proposed. As noted earlier, it was proposed to
compare explanations in the context of IBE. This means that itonly applies, just as
Bayesianism does, in contexts where there are competing hypotheses, each with a
probability greater than zero and less than one. Hence,EOCM was not intended to
provide a value of how well a theory that is now known to be false explains some
body of evidence, a value which could then be compared with that of a current
theory. If we are usingEOCM to implement IBE in order to compare current viable
theories, it seems appropriate thatEOCM gives a value of zero to theories that are
known to be false since they are no longer viable options and he ce do not need
to be considered in IBE. Alternatively, if we are usingEOCM to implement IBE in
order to capture aspects of scientific reasoning in a historical case then a theory
that is now known to be false could be given a non-zero probability (and non-zero
value ofEOCM ) if it was a viable option at the time. Also, since the focus ison
the comparative use of this measure, precision in determining the absolute values
is not so important provided reasonable judgments can be madabout the ranking
of explanations.
In light of the comments made earlier, it is not so clear whether is response
is open to the proponents ofESS andECT . It is doubtful whether they can focus
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solely on comparative judgments since these measures will give the same ranking
of hypotheses for a given explanandum. Furthermore, Glymour’s concerns would
need to be addressed if the explanatory merits of theories now regarded to be false
are to be compared with those of current theories. However, by estricting their
measures to particular historical contexts perhaps a response along similar lines is
possible.
The claim here is that in terms of concerns about which probabilities should
be used, ifEOCM is used as intended in the context of IBE, it faces no problems
over and above those faced by Bayesianism. This of course willseem like a weak
response to those who think that Bayesianism has no adequate response to these
kinds of concerns, but to go further than that in this paper would take us too far
off track.
A possible objection to the response outlined here is that since the approach
is not intended to quantify the explanatory power of theories that are known to
be false, it is inadequate as an approach to IBE; instead, it should be seen as an
approach to model selection.3 Clearly, as Glymour has pointed out, false theories
can still count as explanations. Hence, if one assumes that any approach to IBE
based on the sorts of quantitative measures considered hereshould provide reason-
able non-zero values to false theories, which could then be compared with other
theories, then this is a reasonable objection. However, it is not clear that IBE re-
quires such a general comparison of theories. In his important book on IBE, Peter
Lipton characterized it in terms of inferring the best explanation out of a pool of
potential explanations. One option he considered would be to include all possible
explanations within the pool, but Lipton’s favoured optionwas to ‘define the pool
3I would like to thank a reviewer for raising this objection.
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more narrowly, so that the potential explanations are only the “live options”: the
serious candidates for an actual explanation’ (Lipton [2004, p.59]). In either case,
however, the pool of potential explanations would not include any theories known
to be false. Understood in this way, using a measure such asEOCM to compare
‘live options’ is compatible with IBE.
The suggestion that the approach being advocated should be understood in
terms of model selection is reasonable, but understanding it this way need not
be incompatible with IBE. Whatever the merits of Bayesianism, its proponents
seek to apply it not only as a general approach to scientific infere ce in contexts
where IBE might be applied, but also to the problem of model selection in statis-
tics. The current work could be seen as an attempt to do something similar for
IBE. By articulating IBE in terms of probabilistic measures andevaluating its
performance in various inference tasks, it provides an initial s ep towards an IBE-
based approach to model selection. More will be said about the connection with
model selection in section 6.
2.2 Causal explanation
Supposee1 ande2 are probabilistically independent effects of a common cause,
h. If h raises the probability ofe1 ande2, Glymour points out that the various
measures (apart from Myrvold’s and Wheeler’s) give a positive value. Glymour’s
concern is that the measures ‘confound probability or predictive relations with ex-
planatory relations’ ([2015], p. 596). He acknowledges that a possible response
to this problem is to claim that the measures are ‘to be applied only in cases
which, on other grounds, an explanatory relation obtains betwe n two proposi-
tions’ (Glymour [2015], p. 596). This point is emphasized byboth Glass ([2007])
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and Schupbach ([2011]), but Glymour thinks that this is inadequate.
To make his point he discusses another case where there is a common cause,
h say, ofe1 ande2, but this timee1 is also a cause ofe2. He considers the par-
ticular case in which the probability relation betweene1 ande2 arising from the
causal pathway between them is exactly cancelled by the probability relation be-
tween them due to their common cause. He claims that ‘even though the value of
e1 causes and helps to explain the value ofe2, according to all the probabilistic
measures of explanatory power,1 has no power to explaine2’ (Glymour [2015],
p. 596). While this is correct for theESS andECT measures since1 ande2 are
probabilistically independent and hence have an explanatory p wer of zero, it is
not correct for theEOCM measure. Consider the following example. Let
P (e2|e1&h) = 0.9,
P (e2|∼e1&h) = 0.8,
P (e2|e1& ∼h) = 0.55,
P (e2|∼e1& ∼h) = 0.2,
P (e1|h) = 0.3,
P (e1|∼h) = 0.8,
P (h) = 0.4,
P (∼h) = 0.6.
It is easy to show thatP (e2|e1) = P (e2|∼e1) = 0.62 and hencee1 ande2 are
independent even though they are positively dependent on each other givenh and
also given∼h. If e1 is a cause ofe2, then the positive influence between1 and
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e2 is cancelled by the probability relation between them due totheir common
cause. However, it turns out thatEOCM(e2, e1) = 0.4387 whereasESS(e2, e1) =
ECT (e2, e1) = 0. Furthermore,EOCM(e2,∼e1) = 0.3212 and soe1 provides a
better explanation ofe2 than does∼e1. Hence,EOCM deals with this case in a
satisfactory manner.
While this response is not open to advocates ofESS andECT , they could argue
that in cases involving common causes the explanatory poweris to be determined
by conditioning on each value of the common causes. These measures will typi-
cally give different values, as willEOCM , in examples such as the one above when
conditioning onh and∼h respectively. However, Glymour considers and rejects
this response precisely on the grounds that ‘conditioning on different values of the
common causes will give different values to the measures of explanatory power’
([2015], p. 596). It is difficult to see why this is a problem. In the example above,
the focus is on how welle1 explainse2, but sinceh is also causally and hence
explanatorily relevant toe1 ande2, there is no reason to think that the extent to
which e1 explainse2 should be the same irrespective of whetheris true or false.
For example, when considering the likelihoods in the example given above, it is
clear that the difference (and ratio) between the probability of e2 givene1 ande2
given∼e1 is greater when conditioning onh than on∼h.
In a final point about causal explanation, Glymour draws attention to an ap-
proach to explanatory power based on the difference betweenthe probability of
the effect,e, when a manipulation is carried out to force a causal variable H to
take on the value true and the corresponding probability when a manipulation
forcesH to be false. Several points can be made in response. First, while there is
certainly merit to this approach it is not immediately clearthat it should be seen
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as a rival to the approaches based on the various measures that are criticized by
Glymour and, even if it is, more detailed argument would be ned to show that
it is superior to these approaches. Second, manipulation can be incorporated into
these approaches (see Eva and Stern [2018]). Finally, whileincorporating manip-
ulation seems appropriate for quantifying causal influence, it is not clear that it is
the right approach for quantifying explanatory power. As dicussed earlier,ESS
andECT can be construed as measures of the extent to which a hypothesis leads
us to expect the explanandum and it seems plausible to incorporate manipulation
into measures of this kind.EOCM also attempts to take into account how plausible
the hypothesis is in the first place, but this is missing when ma ipulation is taken
into account since the relevant hypothesis variable is simply forced to be true or
false.
2.3 Finding the truth
In addition to the problems discussed so far, Glymour also draws attention to the
limitations of the various measures in hypothesis selection and he focuses in par-
ticular on the use of theEOCM measure by Glass ([2012]) since it seemed to show
some merit in this regard.4 A general problem for using these measures as statis-
tical tests concerns how various probabilities, such asP (e|∼h) andP (e), are to
be acquired. Focusing onP (e), he rightly points out that ‘hypothesis selection by
statistical testing requires comparing ratios so that the probability of the evidence
does not appear’ (Glymour [2015], p. 601). This criticism isquite legitimate and
4Glymour also presents criticisms of the psychological study carried out by Schupbach
([2011a]), but these will not be considered here.
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so whatever the merits of theEOCM in hypothesis selection, this presents a limita-
tion on its practical usage. A new measure will be proposed insection 3 to address
this problem.
Previous work employed computer experiments to compare howwell various
measures performed in a hypothesis selection task (Glass [2012]). Prior probabil-
ities of hypotheses and likelihoods were randomly selectedfrom uniform distribu-
tions and then one of the hypotheses was selected as the actual hypothesis based
on the prior distribution. Eithere, or ∼e was then selected based on the likeli-
hood for the actual hypothesis. Various measures were then us d to select the
best hypothesis (i.e. the one that had the highest score for agiven measure) and
if it matched the actual hypothesis it was counted as a success for that measure.
This process was repeated ten million times to get an accurate picture of how well
the various measures performed. The results showed that selec ing the hypothesis
with the greatest value ofEOCM gave results that closely tracked hypothesis selec-
tion by maximum posterior probability and outperformed allthe other measures,
including maximum likelihood.
The same paper also considered cases where there is uncertaity as modelled
by a normal distribution in the prior probabilities or, to put it another way, where
the prior probabilities are subjective and do not correspond t the objective prob-
abilities. These subjective priors along with the actual likelihoods were then used
in the various measures and the experiments re-run. The results showed that if
there is sufficient uncertainty in the priors, then selecting he hypothesis with the
greatest value ofEOCM gave more accurate results than hypothesis selection by
maximum posterior probability.
Referring to work by Teng et al. ([unpublished]), Glymour notes hat the re-
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sults do not depend on the choice of the normal distribution to model uncertainty
since similar results are obtained when a uniform distribution is used (see section
5 below for further discussion of this point). However, Glymour raises several
concerns about these findings. First, he claims that the advantage of theEOCM
measure vanishes with small errors in the specification of likelihoods. It is true
that the advantage over maximum posterior probability is lost when there are er-
rors in the likelihoods, but as shown by experiments carriedout by Glass and Mc-
Cartney ([2014]), when there are errors in the likelihoods but not the priors, the
approach based on theEOCM measure still tracks maximum posterior probabil-
ity quite closely and it performs much better than the other masures considered,
including maximum likelihood.5
Second, Glymour says that the approach based on theEOCM measure never
dominates maximum likelihood. However, as just noted, it does in fact dominate
it when there are errors in the likelihoods but not in the priors. It also dominates
maximum likelihood in cases where there are no errors (for small sample sizes)
in either the priors or the likelihoods. Where it fails to dominate maximum like-
lihood is in the case where there are errors in the priors. However, of the three
approaches compared in this case (Glass [2012]) — maximum posteri r probabil-
ity, maximum likelihood and the approach based on theEOCM measure — no ap-
proach dominates the other two for the range considered, which was for values of
0 to 1 for standard deviations in the prior probabilities. However, theEOCM mea-
sure performed better than maximum likelihood for values from 0 to 0.7 and better
5More experiments would need to be carried out to investigatec s s where there are errors in
both priors and likelihoods, but based on experiments that have been carried out it seems likely
that unless the errors for the prior were very large theEOCM measure would perform better than
maximum likelihood.
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than maximum posterior probability for values from 0.4 to 1.Moreover, when the
results were averaged over the entire range theEOCM measure performed best.
Third, Glymour points out that in cases where there are no errors in the prior
probabilities the advantage of theEOCM measure over other measures vanishes
when the sample size increases.6 In fact, as we shall see in section 4 its advantage
over maximum likelihood vanishes for a sample size of about 15, and so a signif-
icant advantage only occurs for very small sample sizes. This, alas, is correct and
it also applies when there are errors in the priors (also shown in section 4).
This issue is closely related to another point mentioned by Glymour: the









. Since it incorporates both the likelihood and
the posterior probability, this explains why it gives better r sults than maximum
likelihood for small sample sizes (when there are no errors in the priors or like-
lihoods). What is the asymptotic behaviour ofEOCM in the limit of large sample
sizes? Leten represent the evidence for a sample size ofn. Taking the limit of the






which explains why the advantage ofEOCM(e, h) over maximum likelihood de-
creases as the sample size increases. This behaviour is evident from results pre-
6Glymour actually refers to the advantage over posterior probability, but since there is no ad-
vantage over posterior probabilities unless there are errors in the priors he presumably means the
advantage over other approaches such as maximum likelihood.
7EOCM (en, h) = P (en|h)P (h)/P (en∨h) and hence the ratio can be written asP (h)/P (en∨
h). Assuming the probability of each outcome is less than one, then he limit ofP (en) asn tends
to infinity is zero and hence the limit ofP (en ∨ h) asn tends to infinity isP (h). Hence, the limit
of EOCM (en, h)/P (en|h) asn tends to infinity is1.
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sented in section 4.
In summary, Glymour has raised a number of very interesting challenges for
measures of explanatory goodness. In offering a response, the focus has been on
the EOCM measure. It has been argued that the problem of ‘excellent but false
explanations’ is no more serious for this measure than it is for Bayesianism and
that adequate responses are available in the case of causal explanations. However,
in the context of usingEOCM for hypothesis selection, there are two significant
issues to which no adequate response has been provided. First, us ng this mea-
sure to compare hypotheses requires obtaining probabilities which are difficult to
determine in practice and, second, the advantage of theEOCM vanishes for larger
(but still relatively small) sample sizes.
It could perhaps be argued that these problems serve to highlight limitations
of using theEOCM measure in practice, but do not undermine it as a measure that
can be used to show that IBE tracks truth. Indeed, when IBE is formulated using
EOCM it tracks results obtained by maximizing posterior probability closely for
very small sample sizes, performing better than maximum likelihood, and as the
result in (4) shows, it gives the same results as maximum likelihood in the limit of
large sample sizes. Nevertheless, a new measure will now be considered in order
to address some of the practical limitations of the theEOCM measure.
3 A New Measure for Comparing Explanations
For a hypothesish that explainse, a simple measure of how good an explanation
it is can be defined as the product of the likelihood and posterior p obability:
17
EPCM(e, h) = P (e|h)× P (h|e), (5)
which will be referred to as the product coherence measure (PCM). Note that
given Bayes’ theorem, it can also be expressed asP (e|h)2P (h)/P (e) or alterna-
tively asP (h|e)2P (e)/P (h).
As the name suggests,EPCM can be considered as a coherence measure. In
fact, it has many features in common with the overlap coherence measure,EOCM .
Clearly, its range is the interval[0, 1] with EPCM(e, h) = 0 whenP (e|h) =
P (h|e) = 0 and EPCM(e, h) = 1 whenP (e|h) = P (h|e) = 1. If it is just
used as a coherence measure (in which case it need not be assumed thath ex-
plainse according to some account of what constitutes an explanation) this means
that consistent logically equivalent beliefs are maximally coherent (for example,
EPCM(e, e) = 1), while logically inconsistent beliefs are incoherent (for example,
EPCM(e,∼e) = 0). Like EOCM , EPCM depends only on the extent of agreement
between two beliefs rather than how probable those beliefs ar in the first place.
More precisely, for fixed values of the relevant conditionalprobabilities,P (e|h)
andP (h|e), it is independent of prior probabilities.8
Hence, like the overlap measure,EPCM exhibits the characteristics of a par-
ticular type of coherence — coherence as agreement rather than as striking agree-
ment — which has been argued in previous work to capture certain intuitions
about coherence better than other approaches (Glass [2005]). However, arguably
it also has some advantages over the overlap measure. Note that EPCM can be
8See (Glass [2005]) for further discussion of this point. In fact, EPCM was mentioned in a




P (e ∧ h)
P (e)P (h)
× P (e ∧ h), (6)
where the first term on the right hand side is Shogenji’s measur of coherence
(Shogenji [1999]). Like many of the coherence measures proposed in the litera-
ture, Shogenji’s measure is also a relevance or confirmationmeasure (in fact, it is
the ratio measure,P (h|e)/P (h) of confirmation), whereas this is not true of either
EOCM or EPCM . However, as equation (6) shows,EPCM can be expressed as the
product of a confirmation measure and the joint probability.B taking confirma-
tion into account, it is sensitive to the dependence betweenh a de in a way that
EOCM is not.
Consider an example adapted from Bovens and Olsson ([2000]) tohighlight
the difference between coherence as agreement and coherence as striking agree-
ment. Suppose there is a roulette wheel with one hundred numbers and in the first
scenario Joe says the winning number is 49 or 50 and Amy says itis 50 or 51. In
the second, scenario Joe says the winning number is 41, 42,. . ., or 60 and Amy
says it is 51, 52,. . ., or 70. As measures of coherence as agreement,EOCM or
EPCM will each yield the same degree of coherence in both cases, 1/3 for EOCM
and 1/4 forEPCM . However, now consider a third scenario where Joe says the
winning number is 41, 42,. . ., or 50 and Amy says it is 41, 42,. . ., or 70. In
this case,EOCM gives the same result of 1/3 as in scenarios one and two since the
relative overlap is unchanged, butEPCM gives a higher coherence than in the other
two scenarios (1/3 compared to 1/4). The difference lies in the fact that there is
stronger dependence between the statements in this case since Joe’s being correct
entails that Amy is also correct.9
9This difference betweenEOCM andEPCM leads to a possible disadvantage toEPCM because
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A well known problem with the overlap coherence measure is that if it is ex-
tended to multiple belief in the obvious way so thatEOCM(h1, . . . , hn) = P (h1 ∧
. . .∧hn)/P (h1∨. . .∨hn), then coherence cannot increase as the number of beliefs
increases. However, it seems clear that acquisition of further beliefs can enhance
the coherence of previously held beliefs. For example, ‘Tweety is a bird’ does not
cohere well with ‘Tweety cannot fly’, but combining these beliefs with ‘Tweety is
a penguin’ results in much greater coherence. In light of equation (6), an obvious
way to extendEPCM to the general case is as follows:
EPCM(h1, . . . , hn) =
P (h1 ∧ . . . ∧ hn)
P (h1) . . . P (hn)
× P (h1 ∧ . . . ∧ hn), (7)
which avoids the problem.10 Suppose for example thath3 = h1 ∧ h2, then it is
easy to show thatEPCM(h1, h2, h3) > EPCM(h1, h2). ExtendingEPCM in this
way makes it a sort of hybrid between measures of agreement, which it is in the
case of two beliefs, and measures of striking agreement. Arguably, this means it
is able to capture the merits of different measures such as the overlap coherence
measure and Shogenji’s measure.
In previous work (Glass [2007]), it was argued that while there is merit to
EOCM is known to be truth-conducive in the case of information pairs (Glass [2007]). It fol-
lows from these differences thatEPCM is not truth-conducive for the same set ofceteris paribus
conditions, though it can be shown to be truth-conducive if more specificceteris paribuscondi-
tions are defined. However, arguably truth-conduciveness should not be considered as an adequacy
condition for coherence: coherence measures should be judgd on other criteria and then their con-
sequences for truth-conduciveness evaluated. As argued her , t re are reasons to preferEPCM
to EOCM as a measure of coherence and it turns out to have better consequences for explanatory
inference.
10Other generalizations could also avoid this problem. For example, it could be generalized to
takej-wise (in)dependence, wherej < n, into account, see Schupbach ([2011b]).
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using either the posterior probability of a hypothesis,P (h|e), or its likelihood,
P (e|h), to rank explanations, these approaches also face problems. It was also
claimed thatEOCM takes account of their advantages while avoiding their prob-
lems. The same points could be made in favour ofEPCM since it is also a com-
bination of posterior probability and likelihood. One particular reason whyEPCM
is a plausible candidate for comparing explanations is that, like EOCM , it satisfies
the explanation ranking condition (Glass [2007]), which can be stated as follows:
For two hypotheses,h1 andh2 that explaine, if P (e|h1) > P (e|h2)
andP (h1|e) > P (h2|e) thenh1 is a better explanation ofe thanh2.
Furthermore, in terms of differences betweenEOCM on the one hand andESS and
ECT on the other, the same points could be made aboutEPCM . In particular, like
EOCM , EPCM is not a confirmation measure and so a high prior probability for a
hypothesis could compensate to some extent for negative relevance. In addition,
the responses presented in defence ofEOCM in sections 2.1 and 2.2 to the ‘excel-
lent but false explanations’ and ‘causal explanation’ objections, apply equally to
EPCM .
Some advantages ofEPCM overEOCM as a measure of coherence have been
noted and one of these is also an advantage forEPCM overEOCM as a measure
of explanation. As discussed earlier, equation (6) shows that EPCM can be ex-
pressed as a product of a confirmation measure and the joint prbability. Given
that the approach to explanation in this paper takes into accunt how plausible the
hypotheses are in the first place, there are reasons for preferring EOCM or EPCM
to eitherESS or ECT as a measure for comparing explanations. However, the de-
pendence between the hypothesis and the evidence is clearlya f ctor in how well
the hypothesis explains the evidence and this provides a reason to preferEPCM
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to EOCM in the context of explanation. Suppose there are two hypotheses,h1 and
h2, each of which provides a potential explanation of evidencee. Further sup-
pose thatP (e) = 2/5, P (h1) = 2/15, P (h2) = 2/3 and thath1 entailse so that
P (e|h1) = 1 while h2 is probabilistically independent ofe so thatP (e|h2) = 2/5.
It is easy to show thatEOCM(e, h1) = EOCM(e, h2) = 1/3 and soEOCM fails to
discriminate between the hypotheses. By contrast,EPCM(e, h1) = 1/3 > 4/15 =
EPCM(e, h2). More generally, in cases where two hypotheses have equal relative
overlap as measured byEOCM , but where one hypothesis,h1, entails the evidence,
while the other,h2, neither entails nor is entailed by the evidence, theEPCM mea-
sure will favourh1.11
Recall that there were two problems for which no defence ofEOCM was pro-
vided in section 2. DoesEPCM fare any better? First,EOCM requires the probabil-
ity of the evidence to be determined and yet often this is unavail ble. By contrast,
the probability of the evidence is not needed when comparingeither likelihoods or
posterior probabilities. In the case of posterior probabilities, ratios can be taken,
in which case the prior probability of the evidence cancels out s that just the like-
lihoods and priors are needed. SinceEPCM is just a product of the likelihood and
posterior probability it also avoids the problem. Suppose two hypothesesh1 and
h2 are to be compared. This can be done as follows:





P (e|h) − 1
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. Furthermore,P (e|h1) = 1 sinceh1 entailse, and soP (e|h1)−1 <
min{P (e|h2)
−1, P (h2|e)
−1}. SupposeP (e|h1)−1 = min{P (e|h2)−1, P (h2|e)−1} − δ, where
δ > 0, and henceP (h1|e)−1 = max{P (e|h2)−1, P (h2|e)−1}+ δ. From this it can be shown that





P (e|h1)× P (h1|e)
P (e|h2)× P (h2|e)
=
P (e|h1)
2 × P (h1)
P (e|h2)2 × P (h2)
, (8)
and hence there is no need to determine the probability of theevidence. Hence,
from this practical point of view,EPCM has a significant advantage overEOCM .12
Second, the advantage of comparing explanations usingEOCM over likelihood
decreases with increase in sample size and this was explained by the fact that in
the limit of large sample size the ratio ofEOCM to the likelihood tends to one,
but this is not the case withEPCM . As with EOCM , EPCM combines both the
posterior probability and likelihood, but taking the limitof the ratio ofEPCM to








and so the influence of the posterior probability is retainedas sample size in-
creases, which is not the case forEOCM as is clear from equation (4). The signif-
icance of this contrast betweenEPCM andEOCM will be investigated experimen-
tally in section 4.
Previous work made a case forEOCM as a measure for comparing explanations
Glass [2007, 2012] based on its properties as a coherence measure. However, as
we saw in section 2, two shortcomings with this approach wereidentified. To
address these issues, a new coherence measure has been proposed,EPCM . The
previous arguments in support ofEOCM all apply toEPCM as well, but further
motivation forEPCM has been provided both in terms of its merits as a measure of
12Of course,EPCM requires the prior probabilities of the hypotheses, but in th s respect it is no
worse than hypothesis selection based on posterior probability. Indeed, as a reviewer has pointed
out, it only requires the ratio of priors which may be easier to estimate. It also does not require
probabilities such asP (e|∼h).
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coherence and as a measure for comparing explanations. In particular, the way in
which it incorporates dependence between the hypothesis and evidence has been
highlighted as an important benefit in the context of explanatio . SinceEPCM is
also able to address the two issues identified, it has clear adv ntages for explana-
tory inference. In terms of how it deals with the second of these issues, it appears
that inference based onEPCM will still have an advantage over other approaches
such as maximum likelihood as sample size increases. Computer simulations will
now be used to investigate this in more detail.
4 IBE and Truth Tracking Revisited
In order to determine how the new measure fares when used in hypothesis selec-
tion, computer simulations were carried out as in the earlier paper (Glass [2012]).
Consider the case of two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive hypotheses,
h1 and h2, each of which can bring about eitheror ∼e. A prior probabil-
ity is obtained from the uniform distribution and assigned to P (h1) and hence
P (h2) = 1−P (h1). By sampling this distribution, one hypothesis is selected and
designated the actual hypothesis. Values are also obtainedfrom a uniform distri-
bution for the likelihoods of the hypotheses,P (e|h1) andP (e|h2). By sampling
the conditional distribution for the actual hypothesis, the outcome is determined
to be eithere or∼e.
Four hypothesis selection strategies can now be considered. Given knowledge
of the prior probabilities, the likelihoods, and the outcome, each strategy uses a
different measure to try to identify the actual hypothesis.The strategies are given
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below:
MPE: most probable explanation; selects the hypothesis with the maximum pos-
terior probability,
ML: selects the hypothesis with the maximum likelihood,
OCM: selects the hypothesis with the maximum value ofEOCM ,
PCM: selects the hypothesis with the maximum value ofEPCM ,
For a given strategy, if it correctly identifies the actual hypothesis, this is counted
as a success, otherwise it is a failure. The process is then repeat d 10,000,000
times with different priors and likelihoods and the accuracy of each strategy at
selecting the actual hypothesis is determined. Further appro ches could be defined
based on theESS andECT measures presented in section 2, but these approaches
give the same ordering as ML and so would yield identical results.
As described above, there are just two hypotheses and one outcome each time,
but this can be generalized for multiple hypotheses, as in the earlier paper, and
for multiple outcomes (i.e. increased sample size). For multiple outcomes, this
is achieved by sampling the conditional distribution for the probability of the evi-
dence given the actual hypothesis the required number of times to get a sequence
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) wherexi is eithere or ∼e. The probability of this sequence
of outcomes given each hypothesis can then be determined under the assumption
that the outcomes are independent and identically distributed and these probabil-
ities used in the four different strategies to select the best hypothesis. In Figure
1, percentage accuracy is plotted for each of the hypothesiss lection approaches
against sample size for the case of two hypotheses. As pointed out previously, the
OCM approach achieves an accuracy very close to that of MPE when the sample
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size is one, but as sample size increases it does not track theMPE result so closely.
When the sample size is 20, for example, the accuracy of OCM is about the same
as ML and some way short of MPE. This is consistent with the result in equation
(4) which showed that the ratio ofEOCM to likelihood tends to one in the limit of
large sample size. It should be noted that all of these approaches eventually con-
verge to an accuracy of one as sample size increases, but it isclear that the OCM
approach has limited merit when compared with ML since it only has a significant























Figure 1: Accuracy plotted as a function of sample size for each of the different
hypothesis selection approaches when there are two hypotheses.
By contrast, the new measure PCM obtains the same level of accuracy as OCM
for a sample size of one, but continues to track the MPE resultclosely for larger
sample sizes. Again, this is consistent with the result given n equation (9). This
advantage of PCM over OCM is also obtained as the number of hypoteses varies.
Previous work (Glass [2012]) found that the OCM result tracksMPE very closely
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as the number of hypotheses increases when the sample size isone. Unfortunately,
OCM does not perform so well when the sample size is larger as indicated in
Figure 2. For a sample size of 20, OCM gets progressively worserelative to
MPE as the number of hypotheses increases from 2 to 10. Again,however, PCM
performs much better. It is much closer to MPE to start with and continues to























Figure 2: Accuracy plotted as a function of the number of competing hypotheses
for each of the different hypothesis selection approaches when the sample size is
20.
These results for the PCM approach to hypothesis selection are very encour-
aging. In terms of IBE, if PCM is an appropriate measure for comparing explana-
tions, then these results go some way to showing that IBE does track ruth. Fur-
thermore, it does significantly better than ML, and hence than approaches based
on the measuresESS andECT . Let us now consider how PCM performs whenever
there is uncertainty in the priors.
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5 Hypothesis Selection under Uncertainty
This section implements the computer simulations carried out in the earlier paper
(Glass [2012]), but now the PCM approach is included and the simulations are
extended to the case where the sample size is greater than one. The probability
model for priors and likelihoods is the same as in section 4, but in this case the
true prior probability distribution is no longer assumed tobe known. Instead of
adopting the true prior forh1, an incorrect value is obtained in the following way.
A number is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and specified
standard deviation and this is added to the true priorP (h1). We can think of this
as an agent’s subjective prior,P ′(h1), provided it lies between 0 and 1. If it does
not, the process is repeated until a value is obtained in the desired interval. The
corresponding value forh2 is thenP ′(h2) = 1 − P ′(h1). This provides a way of
representing uncertainty in the agent’s knowledge of priors.
Results are presented in Figure 3 for the case of two hypotheses. In Figure 3a,
the results are for a sample size of one and so correspond to Figure 3 in (Glass
[2012]). Note that the results for PCM and OCM are indistinguishable. As ex-
pected, when the standard deviation is small, corresponding to low uncertainty,
MPE outperforms all the other approaches. It is also not surprising that for very
large values, corresponding to a high degree of uncertainty, ML outperforms all
other approaches since it does not depend on the priors at all. However, for in-
termediate values between about 0.25 and 0.55 PCM and OCM outperform both











































Figure 3: Accuracy plotted as a function of the standard deviation in the case of
two hypotheses for a sample size of (a) 1, and (b) 10.
over the entire range then PCM and OCM come out on top. This suggets that
these approaches are best for hypothesis selection if the degr e of uncertainty in
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the priors is unknown.
However, as Glymour ([2015]) has pointed out there is a problem with the
OCM approach for greater sample sizes. This is illustrated inFigure 3b where the
sample size is 10. Note that for low values of the standard deviation, OCM per-
forms much worse than MPE and it has little advantage over ML.Note, however,
that the results are very different for PCM. It still exhibitsa imilar advantage over























Figure 4: Accuracy plotted as a function of sample size in thecase of two hy-
potheses for a standard deviation of 0.4.
Figure 4 presents results for a fixed value of the standard deviation (0.4) as
a function of sample size for the case of two hypotheses. Thisis a value where
PCM and OCM outperform MPE and ML for a sample size of one as can beseen
from Figure 3a, but when the sample size has increased to 10, OCM has lost any












































Figure 5: Accuracy plotted as a function of the standard deviation in the case of
five hypotheses for a sample size of (a) 10, and (b) 30.
Figure 5 presents results for the case of five hypotheses. Clearly, similar be-














































Figure 6: Accuracy plotted asα varies in the uniform distribution used to represent
uncertainty in the case of two hypotheses for a sample size of(a) 1, and (b) 10.
for sample sizes of 10 and 30, whereas OCM has lost most of its advantage over
MPE and ML for a sample size of 10 and is almost indistinguishable from ML for
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a sample size of 30.
As pointed out in section 2.3, Glymour ([2015]) notes that the results for OCM
do not depend on the normal distribution to model uncertainty in he priors since
similar results are obtained with a uniform distribution. In order to investigate
this point further and in particular to see whether the same applies for PCM, the
following experiment has been carried out. Priors are drawnfrom a uniform dis-
tribution in the interval[max{P (h1)−α, 0},min{P (h1)+α, 1}] (or equivalently
from the interval[P (h1) − α, P (h1) + α] with resampling if the value does not
lie between 0 and 1). Results obtained for the case of two hypoteses and sam-
ple sizes of one and 10 are presented in Figure 6. Overall, these results illustrate
very similar behaviour to those presented for the normal distribution in Figure 3.
Note, however, that PCM only outperforms MPE for values greater than about
0.4, whereas in the case of the normal distribution it outperforms MPE for a stan-
dard deviation of about 0.25. This can be explained as follows. Forα = 0.25
the subjective priors are within 0.25 of the true value whereas this is not the case
for a standard deviation of 0.25 where the subjective priorscan be much greater.
Hence, it seems plausible thatα = 0.25 corresponds to a lower degree of uncer-
tainty than a standard deviation of 0.25 and so the advantages of PCM are greater
in the latter case.
Hence, in addition to the success of the PCM approach when the priors are
known (section 4), the results in this section show that it also performs much bet-
ter than OCM when the priors are not known accurately. Its advantages persist
when there are more hypotheses to be compared, when the sample size increases,
and when uncertainty in the priors is modelled in a differentmanner.
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6 Parameter Estimation and Model Selection
The focus so far has been on applying the PCM and OCM approaches to IBE and,
in particular, to selecting the best hypothesis from a finiteumber of mutually
exclusive hypotheses. However, we can think of the different hypotheses as dif-
ferent values of a discrete random variable and this raises the question whether a
similar approach can be applied to continuous variables. Toanswer this question
the PCM approach will be applied to simple examples of parameter estimation,
where the goal is to obtain point estimates of an unobserved quantity, and the re-
sults compared with two other approaches. After that, we consider whether the
PCM approach can be applied to the model selection problem.
6.1 Parameter estimation
Let X be random variable with observed datax nd suppose we want to use this
data to estimate a parameterθ. The maximum likelihood approach to parameter
estimation obtains the valueθ that maximizes the likelihood function. This can be





An alternative approach to parameter estimation calledmaximum a posteriori
or MAP defines a prior distributionπ(θ) over the parameterθ and then maximizes




Note that this approach corresponds to the MPE approach thatwas used in the
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discrete case.
Following a similar strategy, a new approach to parameter esimation based on




Let us see how these approaches apply in the case ofn Bernoulli trials such as
the tossing of a coin with an unknown bias,θ ∈ [0, 1], so that the probability ofm












MAP estimation requires a suitable prior distribution to bechosen. Adopting a
beta distribution with parametersα andβ so that:
π(θ|α, β) ∝ θα−1(1− θ)β−1 (15)
results in the following MAP estimate:
θ̂MAP =
m+ α− 1
n+ α + β − 2
. (16)
The PCM estimate can be obtained by substituting (13) and (15)into (12), and
then maximizing with respect toθ by taking the log, then the derivative with re-
spect toθ, and then setting to zero. This results in the following estima e:
θ̂PCM =
2m+ α− 1
2n+ α + β − 2
. (17)
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Before commenting on this result, let us briefly consider parameter estimation
for a one dimensional Gaussian distribution with meanµ and varianceσ2 from



















whereµ0 andσ20 are the mean and variance respectively of the prior distribution.










For both the binomial and Gaussian cases, the PCM result is obtained from the
MAP result by a factor of two being applied to the data (terms involvingm and
n). This derives from the fact that maximizingp(x| θ)2π(θ) in equation (12) is
equivalent to maximizingp(x,x| θ)π(θ) in equation (11) which corresponds to
the data points inx having occurred twice.
What do these results tell us? It can be shown that the PCM estimates lie
between the ML and MAP estimates. That is, for the binomial case:
min{θ̂ML, θ̂MAP} ≤ θ̂PCM ≤ max{θ̂ML, θ̂MAP} (21)
and similarly for the Gaussian case:
min{µ̂ML, µ̂MAP} ≤ µ̂PCM ≤ max{µ̂ML, µ̂MAP}. (22)
This shows that an approach to IBE based on PCM can be applied notonly o
scientific inference in a general sense, but also to parameter es imation and that
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in doing so it produces sensible results. Furthermore, these r ults suggest that
this approach might have benefits over the ML and MAP estimates in some cases.
PCM provides a way of taking prior probabilities into accountwithout giving them
as much weight as MAP. And just as this gave rise to better results in some cases
where there was uncertainty in the priors in section 5, so it culd result in better
parameter estimates in some cases.
Having shown that PCM can give rise to reasonable results in the case of pa-
rameter estimation, let us now consider whether it might also be applied to the
model selection problem.
6.2 Model selection
In the model selection problem, we can think of a model as a family of statistical
hypotheses such as polynomials of a given order used to fit data in a regression
problem. Suppose we have datax and a set of modelsM. The goal in model
selection is to select the model that scores best according to a specified criterion,
where the criterion is intended to represent a trade-off betwe n the complexity of
a model and how well it fits the data. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
is a well-known approach that is based on the classical statistical procedure of
estimation and is given by (Akaike [1973]):
AIC(M,x) = −2 logp(x | θ̂ML) + 2k, (23)
whereM ∈ M, p is a probability density,̂θML is the maximum likelihood esti-
mate, andk is the number of parameters to be estimated.
From a Bayesian perspective, the posterior probabilities oftw models,Mi
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where the termp(x|Mi)/p(x|Mj) is the Bayes factor (Kass and Raftery [1995]).





or equivalently we can minimize the negative log to get:
MMAP = argmin
M∈M
[−logp(x|M)− logp(M)] , (26)
where−logp(x|M) relates to how well the model fits the data and−logp(M) is
a penalty term, where smaller values ofp(M) result in greater penalties.
How might the PCM approach be used for model selection? Based onquation
















or equivalently we can minimize the negative log:
MPCM = argmin
M∈M
[−2 logp(x|M)− logp(M)] , (29)
and so by comparing (29) with (26) we see that the PCM approach gives more
weight to the data and less to the penalty than does MAP. The challenge for
Bayesian approaches such as MAP and hence for PCM as well is to determine
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the factorp(x|M) and to identify appropriate priors. One approach is to use that
adopted in the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) which employs the Laplace
approximation to integrate over the parameter space and assume that the num-
ber of data points,n, is large so that only terms that depend onn are taken into
account (Schwarz [1978]). This means that the priors drop out. Using the PCM
approach with this approximation yields the the same resultas the standard BIC
approach to model selection, which can be expressed as follows:
BIC(M,x) = −2 logp(x| θ̂ML) + k logn. (30)
These results are somewhat encouraging. Based on (29), we seethat an ap-
proach to model selection based on PCM is similar to MAP, but gives more weight
to the data. Clearly, in cases where a uniform prior distribution is adopted over
models there will be no difference between the approaches. Similarly, given the
assumptions underlying BIC, PCM gives rise to the same results.Hence, just
as Bayesian approaches can be applied to model selection, these results suggest
that IBE based on PCM can be similarly applied. Could PCM have advantages
over other approaches such as BIC? One direction for future work in this area
would be to consider other approximations where differences in the priors of the
models would differentiate between the approaches. Relatedto this, another di-
rection would be to investigate how the PCM approach might be related to other
approaches such as the minimum message length (see Wallace and Dowe [1999]).
Model selection has given rise to debate between Bayesians and non-Bayesians
(see Forster and Sober [1994]; Dowe et al. [2007]), so it would be interesting to
see whether the preliminary work here on an approach motivated by IBE might be
extended to contribute to that debate.
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7 Conclusion
An earlier paper set out to show that IBE tracks truth when the overlap coherence
measure (OCM) was used to compare explanations (Glass [2012]). Interestingly,
when IBE was formulated in this way it was extremely successful at finding the
true hypothesis, almost as good as an approach based on maximizing posterior
probability and better than maximum likelihood. Even more surprising was the
discovery that in some cases where there was uncertainty in the prior probabilities
IBE wasmore successfulat finding the truth than maximizing posterior probability
or maximizing likelihood. These results appeared to achieve more than is needed
to defend IBE as a mode of reasoning.
However, Glymour ([2015]) identified a number of general problems for var-
ious measures that seek to use probability to quantify how well a hypothesis ex-
plains the evidence. Responses have been presented here to his objections con-
cerning ‘excellent but false explanations’ and ‘causal explanation’, but some of
his criticisms of the work on hypothesis selection described above have been ac-
cepted. First, it would be difficult to use OCM in practice since it requires deter-
mining the probability of the evidence which is often unavailable and, second, the
advantages of this approach over maximum likelihood vanishfor larger (but still
relatively small) sample sizes.
To address these issues, a new measure (the product coherence m asure, PCM)
has been proposed which has several advantages compared to OCM and solves
both problems. Hence, this new version of IBE, which uses PCM tocompare
explanations, is more successful at tracking the truth thane previous version
based on OCM. Some preliminary work has also been presented toshow how this
approach might be applied to parameter estimation and modelselection. Frequent
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criticisms of IBE are that it is not clearly defined and that theconnection between
explanation and truth has not been established. However, ifPCM provides an ade-
quate measure for comparing explanations, then not only does the account of IBE
provided here address both these criticisms, but IBE is shownt track the truth
much more closely than might have been expected. Furthermor, since it is more
accurate at finding the truth than standard approaches such amaximizing poste-
rior probability or maximizing likelihood in cases involving uncertainty and since
these advantages persist for larger sample sizes, IBE may well have scientific as
well as philosophical merit.
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sium on Information Theory, Budapest: Akad́emiai Kiad́o, pp. 267–281.
41
Bovens, L. and Hartmann, S. [2003]:Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Bovens, L. and Olsson, E. [2000]: ‘Coherence, reliability andBayesian networks’,
Mind, 109, pp. 685–719.
Crupi, V. and Tentori, K. [2012]: ‘A second look at the logic ofexplanatory power
(with two novel representation theorems)’,Philosophy of Science, 79, pp. 365–
385.
Douven, I. [1999]: ‘Inference to the best explanation made coherent’,Philosophy
of Science, 66, pp. S424–S435.
Douven, I. [2013]: ‘Inference to the best explanation, dutch books, and inaccuracy
minimisation’,The Philosophical Quarterly, 63, pp. 428–444.
Dowe, D. L., Gardner, S. and Oppy, G. [2007]: ‘Bayes not bust! why simplicity is
no problem for Bayesians’,The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
58, pp. 709–754.
Eva, B. and Stern, R. [2018]: ‘Causal explanatory power’,The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, axy012, ¡https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy012¿.
Fitelson, B. [2003]: ‘A probabilistic theory of coherence’,Analysis, 63, pp. 194–
199.
Forster, M. and Sober, E. [1994]: ‘How to tell when simpler, more unified, or less
ad hoc theories will provide more accurate predictions’,The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 45, pp. 1–35.
42
Glass, D. H. [2005]: ‘Problems with priors in probabilisticmeasures of coher-
ence’,Erkenntnis, 63, pp. 375–385.
Glass, D. H. [2007]: ‘Coherence measures and inference to thebest explanation’,
Synthese, 157, pp. 275–296.
Glass, D. H. [2012]: ‘Inference to the best explanation: does it track truth?’,
Synthese, 185, pp. 411–427.
Glass, D. H. and McCartney, M. [2014]: ‘Explanatory inferencunder uncer-
tainty’, in E. Corchado, J. A. Lozano, H. Quintián and H. Yin (eds.),Intelligent
Data Engineering and Automated Learning – IDEAL 2014. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, volume 8669, pp. 215–222.
Glymour, C. [2015]: ‘Probability and the explanatory virtues’, The British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science, 66, pp. 591–604.
Kass, R. E. and Raftery, A. E. [1995]: ‘Bayes factors’,Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 90, pp. 773–795.
Lipton, P. [2004]: Inference to the Best Explanation, London: Routledge, 2nd
edition.
Myrvold, W. C. [2003]: ‘A Bayesian account of the virtue of unification’,Philos-
ophy of Science, 70(2), pp. 399–423.
Olsson, E. J. [2005]:Against Coherence, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Psillos, S. [1999]:Scientific Realism: how science tracks truth, London: Rout-
ledge.
43
Schupbach, J. N. [2011a]: ‘Comparing probabilistic measures of explanatory
power’,Philosophy of Science, 78(5), pp. 813–829.
Schupbach, J. N. [2011b]: ‘New hope for Shogenji’s coherence measure’,The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62, pp. 125–142.
Schupbach, J. N. and Sprenger, J. [2011]: ‘The logic of explanatory power’,Phi-
losophy of Science, 78, pp. 105–127.
Schwarz, G. [1978]: ‘Estimating the dimension of a model’,The Annals of Statis-
tics, 6, pp. 461–464.
Shogenji, T. [1999]: ‘Is coherence truth-conducive?’,Analysis, 59, pp. 338–345.
Teng, C. M., Ramsey, J. D. and Glymour, C. [unpublished]: ‘Accura y of hypoth-
esis selection and inference to the best explanation’.
van Fraassen, B. C. [1989]:Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wallace, C. S. and Dowe, D. L. [1999]: ‘Minimum message lengthand kol-
mogorov complexity’,The Computer Journal, 42, pp. 270–283.
Wheeler, G. [2009]: ‘Focused correlation and confirmation’,The British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science, 60, pp. 79–100.
44
